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Abstract
We employ Italian administrative data to analyze the differentials in wages and 
workplace injuries between immigrants and natives over the 1994–2012 period. Via 
propensity score reweighting, we construct the factual and counterfactual, marginal 
and joint distributions of wages and workplace injuries. Examining the differentials 
along the entire distributions, our approach yields novel insights on their potential 
drivers. Our findings confirm that immigrants face lower wages and a substantially 
higher injury risk than natives; futhermore, they highlight that foreign-born workers 
display a disproportionate concentration of injuries around the minimum contractual 
wages. Our results show that the latter can be interpreted as an unintended effect of 
minimum contractual wages. Indeed, if wages are downward rigid and workplace 
safety investments are costly, firms employing low-wage workers may reallocate 
their savings away from wages onto safety. Over time, the gap is found to shrink. 
Our analysis suggests that, beyond the reduction in workplace intensity during 
recessions, this may be due to destruction of marginal jobs. Being disproportionally 
concentrated in marginal occupations, then, lower-skilled migrant workers are more 
vulnerable to downturns in the economic cycle. Overall, our results highlight that 
labour market segmentation may co-exist with wage regulations.
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1 Introduction
Comparing the working conditions of native and migrant workers is a task that 
has captured the attention of media reports, official statistics and of a multidisci-
plinary scholarly literature in different countries. Typically, indeed, foreign workers 
are involved in jobs that are remunerated less and that are riskier than the natives’ 
(Orrenius and Zavodny 2013). Their willingness to accept jobs that natives reject is 
actually an assumption underlying any analysis of the impact of foreign workers on 
the host country’s labour market (e.g., Hamermesh 1999a; Battisti et al. 2017). If, 
in addition, foreigners face an entirely different wage offer curve than natives and 
do not receive adequate compensation for their risk, labor market segmentation (in 
the sense of Hersch and Viscusi 2010) may emerge (Orrenius and Zavodny 2013). 
A fundamental implication of this literature, originally noted by Hamermesh (1997) 
and still understudied, is that, in presence of a binding minimum wage, immigrants’ 
tolerance of worse working conditions will affect a range of job amenities, primar-
ily workplace safety. The trade-off between safety and wage (Hamermesh 1999a, 
b; Boone and van Ours 2006) would cause wage floors to have unintended adverse 
implications for safety (coherently with the results in Hashimoto 1982; Leombruni 
et  al. 2013; Cockx and Ghirelli 2016). Such adverse implications, in turn, may 
become worse in times of recession.
The presence of wage rigidities may thus complicate the analysis of the over-
all wellbeing of migrants and the evaluation of equality when investigating native-
migrants differentials in labor outcomes. This paper employs an administrative data-
set on the Italian labor market to analyze the joint distribution of wages and injuries 
and to investigate differentials between native and foreign born male workers. The 
peculiarity of the Italian labor market offers an opportunity for a comprehensive 
evaluation of the equality in labor market conditions, when job amenities, such as 
workplace safety, can be traded in exchange of pecuniary characteristics such as 
wage. Indeed, in presence of a binding minimum contractual wage, the labour cost 
savings that firms would enjoy by lower remunerations may be transferred onto 
safety savings. In this sense, minimum contractual wages allow us to study the emer-
gence of such effects that would otherwise be due to unobserved characteristics of 
the firms and of their workers.
Our study shows that, first of all, foreign workers face lower wages and greater 
injury risk than natives. Within both groups, lower wage workers face a dispropor-
tionately higher injury risk. Moreover, foreigners’ injury risk greatly exceeds that of 
natives by the same level of wage. In order to identify the extent to which these dif-
ferent distributions are attributable to observable characteristics (e.g. demographic 
characteristics, sectors of occupation), we build counterfactual distributions by pro-
pensity score reweighting (DiNardo et al. 1996). A substantial excess in immigrants’ 




Studying the changes in the concentration of injuries over time and along the 
wage distribution, we show that in all sub-periods, the magnitude of the unexplained 
difference in workplace risk displays a peak at the level of the union wage floor 
threshold, which in Italy is set by collective bargaining, and remains significant even 
by higher wage levels. Intriguingly, the gap reduces over time and especially dur-
ing the economic crisis. Our analysis of the joint distribution suggests that immi-
grants represent marginal workers, whose jobs are more likely to disappear as the 
macroeconomic conditions deteriorate . This evidence is consistent with a hedonic 
model of a dual labor market, where downward pressures on wages are mitigated by 
minimum contractual wage floors and are transferred to workplace safety. Although 
the standard problem of hedonic models does not allow us to quantify how much of 
these unobserved effect are due to lower firms’ or workers’ productivity or to some 
form of discrimination, our analysis clearly emphasizes that immigrants’ health con-
ditions depend on their marginal and weaker position inside the labor market.
Our empirical analysis shows that an unequal allocation of injury risk and mar-
ginality of occupations may occur even in a context characterized by collective bar-
gaining and downward wage rigidity. These dimensions of inequality and of labor 
market segmentation would have remained undetected, had the analysis focused 
solely on wages. The paper, thus, contributes to the recent debate on the effect of 
migration on natives’ labor outcomes by showing that foreign-born workers do not 
compete for the same job as natives, and may actually substitute for them in unpleas-
ant occupations thus relieving their burden of workplace risks (e.g. Giuntella and 
Mazzonna 2015; Giuntella et al. 2016).
Additionally, the main message of our findings is that the observed patterns in the 
differentials in injury rates can be explained by a combination of unobserved charac-
teristics with rigidities in the labor market and that these regulations may contribute 
to make the employment of marginal workers, most probably lower-skilled migrant 
workers, more volatile and subject to the cycle.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theo-
retical framework, grounded in the hedonic wage model. Section 3 introduces our 
methodological approach and our data. Section 4 illustrates the results; Sect. 5 dis-
cusses the main findings; and Sect. 6 concludes.
2  Theoretical framework
Standard economic theory predicts that risk-averse workers will claim higher wages 
for riskier jobs (Rosen 1987). However, several factors may lead to a segmentation 
such that labor markets clear with immigrant workers being forced to accept lower 
wages by less secure working conditions, effectively receiving little or no compensa-
tion for their risk (Viscusi and Hersch 2001; Hersch and Viscusi 2010; Orrenius and 
Zavodny 2013).
The extant labor economics literature has mainly focused on wage gaps. Yet, a 
few notable economic works (e.g. Hamermesh 1997; Bauer et al. 1998; Hersch and 
Viscusi 2010; Orrenius and Zavodny 2013; Dávila et al. 2011), along with a wide 
epidemiological literature, have sought to measure the unequal access of foreign 
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workers to safety, viewed as a job amenity. Orrenius and Zavodny (2009, 2013) 
show that, in most countries, foreign workers are overrepresented in occupations 
and industries with greater injury risk. Other studies (e.g. Giuntella and Mazzonna 
2015; Giuntella et al. 2016) suggest that immigrants substitute for native workers in 
unpleasant occupations and that this reallocation may relieve their burden of work-
place risks. Whether this translates in ceteris paribus greater injury and fatality rates 
for foreigners than for natives (as found by Orrenius and Zavodny 2009; Salminen 
2009; Ahonen and Benavides 2006; Bena and Giraudo 2014) is an empirical issue 
which is heavily affected by the availability of data and by the empirical specifica-
tion applied.
The mechanisms that determine the equilibrium levels of wages and workplace 
safety can be explained in the framework of the hedonic wage models (Ehrenberg 
and Smith 2016; Rosen 1974), represented graphically in the upper-left panel of 
Fig. 1.
The hedonic model assumes that workers maximize their expected utility, which 
is a function of wages and of other workplace amenities. From among the set of 
possible workplace amenities, we consider workplace safety. The curves refer to 
natives (N) and foreigners (F) with homogeneous characteristics (e.g. industry, 
occupation, age, etc.), for instance young blue collar workers in the manufacturing 
sector. Employees’ wages and workplace safety investments represent costs to the 
employer; hence, bundles with lower wages and less safety represent greater profits 
Fig. 1  Hedonic Wage Model. Wage by injury risk. a Different positioning of foreign and native workers 
on the isoprofit curve; b corner solution due to the minimum wage/wage floor constraint; c effect of the 
crisis on the injury-wage combinations
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for the firm. However, the curves are upward sloped because a higher level of dis-
amenity (i.e. risk) must be compensated by a higher salary. The resulting isoprofits 
are represented as straight lines for simplicity and are drawn for the two types of 
workers, assumed to have the same observable characteristics: natives ( Π(wN ,RN) ) 
and foreigners ( Π(wF,RF) ). The intercepts of the isoprofit lines are N for the natives 
and F for the foreigners. Although they refer to the same job and the same sector 
for workers with similar characteristics (e.g. age, education, tenure, firm size), the 
two intercepts may differ. Possible reasons include: lower productivity of foreigners 
as workers (e.g. less education, less language proficiency, etc.) and of the firms that 
hire them; assignment to more dangerous tasks (unobserved) within the same occu-
pation and sector, or less risk-aware behaviour by the worker; taste-based discrimi-
nation; monopsonistic discrimination; less unobserved safety investments of firms 
that hire foreigners; and, as we will see more in detail later, the economic cycle, if 
foreign workers are allocated to tasks which are more subject to cyclical variation in 
working efforts. With such a segmentation, migrants will face lower isoprofit curves.
If workplace safety is a normal good, workers may want to trade off part of their 
earnings for greater safety and sort into safer occupations. But a range of factors 
may limit immigrants’ ability to claim a compensation for their risk or to trade wage 
for safety, in which case their isoprofit curves will also be flatter than the natives’ 
(Hersch and Viscusi 2010; Orrenius and Zavodny 2013). Inferior language profi-
ciency, bureaucratic difficulties in the recognition of their skills, conditionalities in 
the attribution of the residence permit, weaker social networks and trade union inte-
gration (Orrenius and Zavodny 2013) reduce immigrants’ outside options and make 
their labor supply less elastic to wage and more likely to suffer from monopsonis-
tic discrimination. This type of discrimination may also originate from differences 
in immigrants’ reservation wages (Manning 2003; Amior 2017), and in preferences 
over non-wage attributes (Bhaskar and To 1999; Booth and Coles 2007). The het-
erogeneity in these attributes could affect the overall quality, i.e. including safety 
conditions, of the jobs offered to foreign workers.
U(wN ,RN) and U(wF,RF) represent the indifference curves of natives and for-
eigners, respectively. Obviously, the worker gets more utility the closer her indiffer-
ence curve gets to the top-left corner, i.e. by higher salary and lower injury risk.1 In 
equilibrium, by virtue of their higher intercepts, natives will enjoy more safety and 
higher wages than foreigners.
In the upper right panel of Fig.  1, we introduce the wage floor. In absence of 
policy constraints, given a range of unobserved characteristics of the worker and of 
the employer (including discriminatory attitudes), suppose the equilibrium on the 
immigrants’ labor market corresponds to the wage-safety bundle A, which is located 
below the corresponding wage floor threshold set by collective bargaining. To com-
ply with the contractual wage floor, firms would have to climb the isoprofit curve up 
to point A’. This would configure a corner solution located on a lower indifference 
1 We assumed immigrants and natives have the same indifference curves, but immigrants’ indifference 
curves may be flatter: especially in the early phases of the migration project, immigrants may accept 
risky jobs if these allow them to make fast money (cfr. Dávila et al. 2011).
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curve for the foreign worker, by which salary is higher ( w′
F
 ) but at the cost of an 
increased occupational risk ( R′
F
 ). To restore the unrestricted level of safety RF , an 
exogenous shock should affect the isoprofit curve and increase the intercepts up 
to a level where the new isoprofit crosses the union wage floor level at RF . This 
could occur if macroeconomic conditions improve, if policy changes intervene, if 
the employer removes any discriminatory attitudes, or if the foreign worker’s human 
capital, experience or bargaining power increase radically; however, the foreign 
worker’s capacity to affect these processes may be very limited.
If, on the contrary, the economic conjuncture worsens, the level of occupational 
risk in a segmented labor market may ceteris paribus become unbearable in pres-
ence of a binding wage floor. In the bottom panel of Fig. 1 we address this issue. 
Assume there are two states of the economy: good (G) and bad (B). State (G) cor-
responds to the situation depicted in the upper-right panel; when the economy is 
in a bad state (B), by the same level of risk, firms are willing to pay lower salaries 
(or, conversely, by the same level of salaries, are less able to invest in safety). This 
implies that the isoprofit curves in state ΠB will be lower. To comply with the union 
wage floor, the firm will have to offer the same minimum salary it was offering in 
state G, but the corresponding occupational risk will be even higher ( R′
F,B
 ). If the 
firm runs substantial losses during the downturn, the isoprofit curve may move so 
low that no bearable level of risk would be compatible with the wage floor. Hence, 
the employer will find it preferable to lay off the foreign worker.
Indeed, recent studies show that the labor outcomes (mainly unemployment, 
employment, wages) of foreign workers are more sensitive than the natives’ to fluc-
tuations in the economic cycle (e.g., Dustmann et al. 2010; Orrenius and Zavodny 
2010). This occurs because immigrant workers are disproportionately more fre-
quently offered precarious contracts. More generally, employers may consider immi-
grants a risky investment and they may tend to evaluate their productivity in the 
short rather than in the longer run. Consequently they may consider unprofitable to 
invest in their training, including safety training. Hence, it is reasonable to expect 
that migrants are more vulnerable to downturns, since in a rigid labor market, an 
employer facing cost-saving pressures will tend to dismiss the less protected workers 
first.
Empirically, this could translate into two opposing effects: (a) if the binding effect 
of the wage floor prevails on the incentives to dismiss, we should observe a persis-
tence or even an increase in the wage and injury gaps between foreign and natives; 
(b) if the effect of the downturn is mainly in terms of destroying the jobs of the for-
eign workers, the observed gap should narrow down. The latter would support the 
interpretation that immigrant workers are actually marginal workers and that their 
employment results from a corner solution.
Biddle and Hamermesh (2013), in the US context, find that downturns tend to 
increase the wage gaps between women and men but to decrease the gaps between 
African–Americans and whites, due, according to them, to composition effects due 
to job changes. If there is a trade-off between wage and safety, however, an exclusive 
focus on wages may miss part of the picture. Hence, we include the role of work-





In order to analyze the different components of the wage and injury gap, we 
employ the decomposition introduced by DiNardo et al. (1996) (hereinafter DFL 
decomposition) and its application to discrete data (Biewen 2001). This meth-
odology allows us creating a counterfactual immigrant population which is 
employed in the same sectors, with the same occupation, contracts, age, tenure 
and gender profile as the observed immigrant population, but is paid according to 
the wage schedule of the natives (or faces an injury risk comparable to those of 
natives, cfr. DiNardo et al. 1996). Hence, we distinguish the effect of the work-
ers’ characteristics on injury and wages from the effect of the remuneration of the 
workers’ characteristics along the whole wage and injury distributions.
The DFL decomposition is implemented by computing the propensity scores 
to be an immigrant and to be a native based on a set of characteristics, and by 
reweighting each observation in the native subsample by the ratio of the two 
(Hirano et al. 2003). The weights are included in a kernel density function applied 
to the observations of the natives. In this reweighed distribution, those natives 
who are more similar to immigrants are weighted more; hence, analysing injury 
rates and wages of this distribution gives a measure of what wages and injury 
rates natives would display if they had the same characteristics as the immigrants.
We prefer this approach to methodologies based on differences in means (i.e. 
Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition) or quantile regressions where wages are ana-
lyzed conditional on injuries. As discussed by DiNardo (2002) and Brunell and 
DiNardo (2004), the Oaxaca–Blinder approach can itself be viewed as a reweight-
ing technique yielding estimates of a reweighted mean; conversely, the DFL 
approach can be viewed as a generalisation of the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposi-
tion. The Oaxaca–Blinder and the DFL decomposition yield very similar results, 
which are numerically equivalent when the set of covariates is composed entirely 
by categorical variables. From this point of view, the advantage of the DFL 
decomposition is to yield estimates of the entire reweighted distribution rather 
than just of the mean. Moreover, the nature of our key variable of interest, i.e. 
injuries, which are rare events, constrains our ability to run quantile regressions. 
As the distribution of workplace accidents is characterized by a large mass of 
zeros (about 96%, which becomes even larger when considering severe injuries), 
most quantiles would be equal to zero, so this regression would not be particu-
larly informative. More generally, a regression of wage on injuries, conditional 
on all available workers’ and job characteristics, would lead to the estimation of a 
negative coefficient due to the ability bias determined by the unobserved charac-
teristics of native and migrants (i.e. differences in the intercepts shown in Fig. 1, 
see, e.g. Hamermesh 1999a). We believe that the comparison of the real distribu-
tions with the counterfactual ones is more informative on the effects of unobserv-
ables on the (joint) distribution of wages and injuries.
As shown by Barsky et al. (2002), DiNardo (2002) and Brunell and DiNardo 
(2004), the DFL approach is equivalent to viewing the immigration status as a 
“treatment” and to analyze the effect of being an immigrant on the distribution 
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of wages and injuries under a “selection on observables” set of assumptions (e.g. 
Heckman et al. 1997).
More formally, in the DFL framework, we can write the density of an outcome 
variable y (the wage density, or the distribution of injuries) as a function of the 
immigration status T, where T = 1 if the person is an immigrant and T = 0 if the per-
son is not an immigrant, and of a set of characteristics z (see DiNardo 2002; Brunell 
and DiNardo 2004). This derives from the definition of conditional probabilities:
In our case, f (y|T = 1) is either the wage density or the injury density that applies 
to immigrant workers. We treat injury density as a continuous variable because we 
measure injuries as a ratio of total injuries to total leave-adjusted full-time equiva-
lent person-years worked in a given cell of homogeneous characteristics. f (y|T = 0) 
is the corresponding density that applies to non-immigrant workers. As in the DFL 
approach, the counterfactual distribution of y that would prevail if natives had the 
same distribution of characteristics as immigrants, can be written as a reweighted 
distribution of the observed density of natives:2
The weights wz are defined as the ratio of the density of characteristic z in the two 
subsamples. They can be seen as the ratio of the probability to observe a given char-
acteristic (or combination of characteristics) among immigrants to the probability to 
observe it among natives. This way of seeing it allows a convenient simplification:
where the second equality derives from applying the Bayes’ law. While estimation 
of h(z|T) is hampered by a dimensionality problem, the conditional probability of 
being an immigrant given z can be estimated by binary choice models such as logit 
or probit; P0 and P1 correspond respectively to the share of natives and the shares 
(1)f (y|T = 1) = ∫ f 1(y|z)h(z|T = 1)dz
(2)f (y|T = 0) = ∫ f 0(y|z)h(z|T = 0)dz






1 − P(T = 1|z)
P0
P1
2 As discussed in Barsky et al. (2002), one might be tempted to study the opposite, i.e. the counterfac-
tual distribution of wages and injuries which would prevail if immigrants had the same characteristics 
as natives. This, however, would imply an extrapolation rather than an interpolation, and would increase 
the estimation error because a large set of combinations of characteristics that we observe for natives are 




of immigrants in the sample.3 Essentially, wz give more weight to native individuals 
who display characteristics that are more similar to the immigrants’. Plugging the 
weights into a kernel density function allows estimating the counterfactual densities 
of y at each point yt:
where h is the bandwidth and K is a kernel function—the gaussian in our application 
as well as in DiNardo et al. (1996). The reweighting procedure allows constructing 
a fictitious immigrant population which is employed in the same sectors, with the 
same occupation, age, tenure and gender profile as the observed immigrant popula-
tion, but is paid according to the wage schedule of the natives (or has a risk propen-
sity comparable to that of natives) (cfr. DiNardo et al. 1996). This procedure can be 
straightforwardly extended to construct the counterfactual concentration curves for 
injuries and wages (as in Razzolini et al. 2014), as well as the counterfactual joint 
distribution of wages and injuries.
The choice of the characteristics z which we use to estimate the propensity scores 
is largely data driven (see Sect. 3.1): as regards the work relationship, we include 
firm size, firm age, 18 sectoral dummies, region of work, and type of contract; as 
regards the individual, we include age, gender, qualification, tenure, and, for the 
years where the information is available, and a binary variable equal to 1 if the per-
son received family allowances.
The differences between the observed and the counterfactual distributions of 
natives give a measure of the gaps due to the difference in characteristics; the dif-
ferences between the counterfactual and the observed distribution of foreigners give 
a measure of the “unexplained” or “residual” difference (see DiNardo et al. 1996; 
Biewen 2001; Barsky et al. 2002, for a more formal discussion).
A limitation of this approach is that it does not allow disentangling systematic 
differences between the natives and the immigrants which are due to observable 
characteristics that are an exclusive attribute of immigrants—for example, language 
difficulties—from more subtle differences due, for example, to discrimination. Yet, 
the dynamics of both the “explained” and “residual” component can be studied and 
yield useful descriptive insights.
Related to this, the composition of immigrants may affect the results.4 An impor-
tant distinction must be made in this regard. To the extent that compositional effects 
can be captured by observable characteristics, they do not pose a problem to our 
analysis; they do, instead, if changes in the composition drive changes in unobserv-
able characteristics. In Appendix section “Compositional effects”, we carefully scru-











3 If these combinations could be fully explained by discrete data, the nonparametric analogue of this 
procedure would be to study the relative shares of immigrants and natives within the each of the cells 
corresponding to each combination of characteristics.
4 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this issue.
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country of origin changes significantly over time, this does not seem to be the main 
driver of the dynamics in the gaps in injury rates and wages, which is reassuring 
with respect to the validity of our analysis.
Similarly to the common support condition that is required for the validity of pro-
pensity score matching (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008), our approach requires that 
the individuals in our treated and control groups are compared over a range of com-
parable characteristics. Failing to ensure common support would in our case result 
in extremely large or extremely low weights. To avoid extremely large weights, we 
discarded the observations for which P̂(T = 1|z) < min[P̂(T = 0|z)] (cfr. Dehejia 
and Wahba 2002), which typically implied dropping a negligible number of obser-
vations every year. Moreover, to mitigate unobserved heterogeneity, we focus our 
analysis of the joint distribution of injuries and wages on the subsample of male, 
blue-collar workers operating in the manufacturing sector.
Our factual group is composed of all migrants from “high migration pressure” 
(HMP) countries—we refer to them as “foreigners” or “immigrants” throughout 
our discussion; the corresponding “unfactual” group is composed of workers born 
in Italy and in advanced development countries—which we throughout refer to as 
“natives” for simplicity.5
To analyse the relationship between injuries and wages, we first analyse wage 
gaps and injury gaps separately, then we use the observed and counterfactual sub-
samples to compute wage deciles and the injury rates in each decile (in Appendix 
section “Concentration curves” we also study concentration curves in the observed 
and counterfactual subsamples; see Wagstaff et al. 1991; Kakwani et al. 1997).6
3.1  Data
We use administrative data deriving from the linkage of the Work Histories Italian 
Panel (WHIP), a 1:15 sample of the Italian social security data, with administrative 
records from the Italian Workers’ Compensation Authority (INAIL) for 1994–2012 
(Bena et  al. 2012). This dataset uniquely offers individual level information on 
injuries.7 Overall, the dataset includes between 600,000 and 1,400,000 individual 
5 The choice of such factual and unfactual groups is motivated by the need to ensure the largest pos-
sible homogeneity among each group of workers. The results are very similar when we use the whole of 
the foreign population (including immigrants from advanced economies) as the factual and the strictly 
Italian-born population as the comparison group, given that the population of foreign workers in Italy is 
largely composed of workers from HMP countries.
6 In all cases, we performed the analysis using two measures of injuries: (1) all reported and certified 
injuries; and (2) severe injuries, i.e. the more severe injuries requiring immediate hospitalization. The 
results are fully consistent but less precise for severe injuries, due to their smaller numerosity. Hence, 
for the sake of brevity in what follows we report the results for the entire set of injuries only. The main 
results for severe injuries are reported in “Appendix”.
7 Unfortunately, our data are not informative as to workers’ mental health, hence we cannot connect the 
occurrence of injuries with the sources of psychological distress on the job, which we recognise as a 
potentially fruitful avenue for future research. The only source of data on psychological distress in our 
administrative sample is the cases of sickness leave that are due to hospitalizations associated with a 
mental health diagnosis, e.g. for depression. This clearly represents an extreme case, and would only pro-
vide insights on a very small and specific subset of all possible mental health problems and psychologi-
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records for each of the 18 years in the sample. It provides information on individual 
and job characteristics (age, sex, place of birth, type of occupation, type of contract, 
family allowances, tenure, firm age, sector, size of firm, number of leave-adjusted 
full-time equivalent weeks worked in a year, part-time job, earnings) of regularly 
employed workers in the private sector. It also includes information about the num-
ber of work-related injuries (all of which are certified by physicians), their level of 
severity, and the lost days of work. Hence, our data set provides an exceptionally 
rich source of information which we use to analyze the joint distribution of earnings 
and workplace injuries.
Despite this wealth of information, there are three main limitations in our data. 
First, a precise estimation of injury risk is only available for employees in the non-
agricultural private sector, as employees in other sectors are either not covered 
(public sector, agriculture and fishing), or the available information is inadequate 
to measure the exposure to injury risk (hours of work and days of work for self-
employed workers are imprecisely measured). Lack of reliable information also 
forces us to exclude domestic workers, which is particularly unfortunate considering 
the importance of this sector for female immigrants’ employment in Italy. Therefore, 
as mentioned, we focus on male workers.
Second, like many administrative records used to compute social security ben-
efits, our data set has no information on education nor a very detailed occupational 
classification, as these variables do not enter the benefit formula directly. Fortu-
nately, the data does include information on whether the worker is a blue or a white 
collar, or whether she has managerial tasks, which tends to be highly correlated with 
education.
A third set of considerations concerns the internal validity of our results. Indeed, 
the workers in our administrative dataset had access to a regular contract. Since the 
1998 immigration reform popularly known as Turco-Napolitano, stay permits are 
yielded conditional on having access to a regular work contract. Hence, it is fair to 
consider that all workers in our sample were regularly residing in Italy in the con-
sidered period. Moreover, access to a regular contract implies for the wide majority 
of workers to be subject to collective bargaining agreements. This should reduce 
the relevance of “chilling effects” and underreporting (Watson 2014) for the foreign 
workers in our sample. Nonetheless, regularly employed immigrant workers may be 
particularly reluctant to report their injuries if they fear that this will lead to a ter-
mination of a fixed-term contract (Boone et al. 2011) and if they have not yet access 
to a long-term residence permit (“Carta di Soggiorno Permanente” until 2007), 
which is yielded after 5 years of regular residence (see Appendix section “The role 
of the 5-year requirement for long-term stay permits”). These considerations led us 
to study not only injuries as a whole, but also what, in this paper, we refer to as 
“severe injuries”. The definition of severe injuries is not simply based on whether 
the injury leads to a particularly complex medical condition of the victim, but also 
cal distress affecting workers. Moreover, these are data on sickness leaves and not on injury leaves, hence 




on whether it requires immediate hospitalization (Bena et al. 2012). In other words, 
we could also refer to these as “immediate-care” injuries. The specification is rel-
evant because, due to the fact that they require immediate hospitalization, these inju-
ries are not subject to reporting bias, unless in extreme cases of criminal behaviour 
(Leombruni et al. 2019). Hence, in relation to the population of workers employed 
with regular contracts, measurement error and reporting bias should have negligible 
effects at least for what concerns severe injuries, that lead to very similar results as 
overall injuries.8
However, lacking data about less protected informal employment probably lead 
us to underestimate actual workplace injuries. More specifically, Bianchi et  al. 
(2012) have shown, using data from regularizations (1995, 1998, 2002), that there is 
a high correlation between the number of documented and undocumented migrants. 
Bratti and Conti (2018) have provided further evidence that the spatial distribution 
of irregular migrants is highly correlated with the one of regular migrants, over 
province and over time. This indicates that the ratio between regular and irregular 
migrants have remained constant in the period under observation. According to 
Bianchi et al. (2012), the ratio of irregular to regular migrants was about one-third. 
Relying exclusively on documented migrants implies that, according to them, we are 
omitting from the analysis a proportion of foreign born workers in Italy that is fairly 
constant and close to one-third. The working conditions of irregular immigrant are 
presumably worse than those of the regular ones; even if, in principle, the INAIL 
insurance coverage and the access to the national health system are guaranteed in 
Italy to both documented and undocumented migrants, the latter are probably more 
inclined to underreport their injuries, and more reluctant to access the INAIL or the 
public health services in case of injury. Hence, the results shown in the paper have 
to be considered as a lower bound of the issue at stake.
8 We neglect the opposite case, i.e. the possibility that workers over-report their injuries. In principle, 
because the amount and duration of the injury allowance from INAIL depends on the severity of the 
injury, it is possible that severe injuries occurring at the end of a temporary contract give rise to pay-
ments that extend beyond the duration of the contract—however, not to an extension of the contract 
itself. Hence, theoretically, workers with a temporary contract could see an incentive to over-report inju-
ries at the end of their contract, so as to ensure a flow of payments that extend beyond the duration of 
the contract. This theoretical possibility seems to have little practical implications. Indeed, injuries must 
be denounced by the employers via a public act that is verified by the INAIL (the legislative framework 
is set in the “Testo Unico Infortuni”, D.P.R. 1124/1965, and “Testo Unico Sicurezza”, D.Lgs. 81/2008). 
This implies that, following the report of a workplace injury, INAIL officers may visit the firm establish-
ments to verify the injury declarations as well as the persistence of the necessary workplace safety condi-
tions. Following a workplace injury report, the insurance premium paid by the employer may increase. 
In short, the incentive for the worker to over-report an injury clashes with the incentive for employers to 
under-report them. Even in case of collusive behaviors between employer and employee (which could 
apply for instance in the case of small, family firms), the injury must be verified by medical staff. Hence, 
to over-report injuries, firms and workers jointly should have strong reasons to deliberately engage in 
illegal behaviours, a condition that we assume not to be pervasive. Moreover, as discussed, the literature 
on the issue tends to support the opposite: on-the-job tenure and knowledge of workplace hazards tend to 
decrease injury risk (Benavides et al. 2006; Morassaei et al. 2012; Giraudo et al. 2016); workers tend to 
underreport their injuries in times of economic uncertainty (Boone and van Ours 2006); and those who 
report workplace injuries tend to be at higher risk of losing their jobs (Boone et al. 2011).
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Our dataset allows investigating a time span of 18 years, during which a num-
ber of significant macroeconomic and policy changes of relevance to immigration 
occurred: considering that restrictions to regular employment are considered among 
the legal and institutional risk factors for severe labor exploitation (FRA 2015), 
these changes are likely to have an effect on the distribution of wages and injuries 
among foreign workers.
In what follows, we will split our data into four periods of approximately equal 
length, aiming to ensure relatively uniform institutional framework and economic 
cycle conditions. The first period covers 1994–1998, a period marked by increasing 
unemployment rates across the country and by the entry into force of the Schen-
gen Treaty establishing free movement of people within the EU. During the second 
period, 1999–2002, still corresponding to a mainly negative phase of the economic 
cycle, the first of the two major immigration reforms in Italy, Law nro. 40/1998, 
popularly known as Turco-Napolitano after its proponents, was passed. The law 
introduced the first restrictions to immigration flows, conditioning residence permits 
for immigrants to having a job. The third period, 2003–2007, witnessed a more posi-
tive phase in the cycle, the EU enlargement from 15 to 27 Member States and the 
entry into force of the second immigration reform, Law nro. 189/2002, popularly 
known as the Bossi–Fini law, which introduced some further restrictions to resi-
dence permits for immigrants. The fourth period, lasting from 2008 to 2012, encom-
passes the years of the Great Recession.
3.2  Descriptives
Descriptive statistics for 1994, 2003 and 2012 are reported in “Appendix” in Table 1. 
While substantial gaps and differences emerge between the groups of natives and 
foreigners, a tendency towards convergence can be noted for most variables.
In Table 2, we report the factors that correlate most strongly with injury risks. 
The results unambiguously indicate that workers having spent a longer time within 
the same work relationship and are employed with open-ended contracts are signifi-
cantly less likely to get injured. The age coefficient is negative for overall injuries 
but positive for severe injuries. This suggests that age, presumably due to experience 
and knowledge of the tasks, allows workers to prevent the occurrence of less severe 
injuries, but that ageing may be detrimental for job safety if it entails a deterioration 
in the physical abilities that workers need to perform safely at work. Interestingly, 
labour market experience affects the probability to get injured differently for for-
eign and native workers, indicating learning effects for natives but not for foreign-
born workers. We interpret this as an indication that foreign workers are exposed to 
cumulative and self-reinforcing dynamics that prevent their investments in skills and 
safety upgrading and lock them into more and more dangerous jobs and tasks (see 
discussion in Appendix section “Factors affecting injury rates”).
Other aspects of the working conditions of natives and foreign workers that may 
affect their vulnerability but that we cannot directly control for in our analysis are 
reported in Table 4. The information is drawn from the 2009 release of the Italian 
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Labour Force Survey and is compared with the insights on the distribution of inju-
ries that can be drawn from our administrative data.
For the sake of comparison, we also report in Column 1 the descriptive statistics 
on absence from work (illness, injury o temporary disability) for aggregated ethnic 
groups. Italian workers turn out to be more absent from work than workers from 
New Member States (i.e. Romania, Bulgaria). Workers from North Africa display 
more absences than Italian workers.
Workers from North Africa are also relatively more likely to be involved in shift 
work than Italian workers or workers from NMS3 (New Member States accessed in 
2007, mainly Romanian workers). The second and third columns of Table 4 report 
the percentages of workers involved in evening and night work, respectively, by 
nationality groups. Workers from North Africa, as well as from other high migration 
pressure areas, are more likely to engage in evening and night work than Italians and 
workers from NMS3.
This may lead to an increase in the risk to get injured during evening and nights. 
To gain insights on this, we can leverage the availability, among our administra-
tive data, of information on the time of the injury. Clearly, this is only available for 
the minority of workers who experience injuries. Hence, it is useful to draw some 
descriptive facts regarding the more vulnerable labour market status of immigrants 
but cannot be employed as a proxy for night work nor included among the propen-
sity scores covariates.
Indeed, while most injuries occur during day time—because most workers work 
during the day shift, our administrative data indicate some concentration of reported 
accidents at 0 am (6.46% of all injuries, which is higher than the 4.16% that would 
prevail if injuries were uniformly distributed over the 24 h, and even higher consid-
ering that only a minority of workers are working during night shifts). The uncondi-
tional distribution of severe injuries is similar, but these injuries are relatively more 
likely to occur between 5 and 7 am. Considering as “night” any working hours after 
7 pm and before 8 am, foreign-born workers are indeed 4% more likely to get injured 
during night hours.
We would expect the inclusion of proxies for night work work to decrease the 
gap in injury rates. In general terms, the groups of foreign workers who, based on 
LFS data, are more likely to work at night, are found to experience higher injury 
rates in our data. On the contrary, workers from New EU Member States in Eastern 
Europe are less likely to work during night shifts according to LFS data and, indeed, 
experience lower injury rates. Nonetheless, the extent to which our estimates may 
be affected by the inclusion of a measure for night work is difficult to predict. The 
extent to which night work can be a risk factor depends to a large extent on unob-
served factors such as firm’s internal safety regulations—the manufacturing firms 
requiring their workers to engage in night work may want to implement specific 
measures to ensure the safety of their workers during night shifts. The vast majority 
of workers get injured during the day, and the magnitude of the gap in injury rates 
that we estimate is about ten times larger than the difference in the probability to 
get injured at night. This leads us to expect that the inclusion of this term would 
decrease, but not entirely explain the injury gap; nonetheless, this point should be 
addressed by further research devoted specifically to the issue.
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Information on Saturday and Sunday work from the LFS, shown in Columns (4) 
and (5) of Table 4, indicates that NMS3 workers (i.e., mainly Romanian workers) are 
more likely to work on Saturday than Italian or North African workers. In turn, Ital-
ian workers engage more in Sunday work than other ethnic groups with the excep-
tion of workers from Near and Middle East. The distributions of foreign-born and 
native workers’ injuries over weekdays drawn from administrative data, however, 
display similar distributions, not highlighting a specific tendency of foreign-born 
workers to get injured during weekends. Rather, immigrants appear slightly more 
likely than natives to get injured on Friday and slightly less likely to get injured on 
Monday.
As regards natives’ and foreign workers’ propensity to work overtime, LFS data 
on the number of hours usually worked, the number of hours actually worked dur-
ing the last week, and the amount of paid and unpaid overtime is reported in Col-
umns (6)–(9). There are no striking differences between Italian workers and the 
largest ethnic groups in Italy. However, sector and task heterogeneity may still be 
present, since the length of the working time may depend on the harshness of the 
task undertaken.
The above is confirmed by the analysis of the injury data, with an important spec-
ification. Indeed, our data also report information relating to the so-called “ordinal 
hour” of the injury, i.e. the time since the start of the shift. For both native and for-
eign workers, about 50% of the injuries occur within the first 4 h of the shifts. For-
eign workers’ injuries are only slightly more likely to occur after the 8th hour, i.e. 
0.06% more frequently, hence from this point of view the concentration of foreign 
workers’ injuries during “long” hours is only quite limited.
However, foreign workers’ injuries appear significantly more concentrated within 
the “zero” hour (i.e., right after starting the shift). Even when excluding injuries 
having occurred on the way to and from work, foreign workers are 6% more likely to 
get injured during this “zero hour”. Clearly, this is no clear evidence of concentra-
tion of foreign workers during long hours. Yet, it is possible that this excess in inju-
ries is due to undeclared overtime work having occurred on the day before the injury 
is declared, and may indicate the presence of “gray” work among these workers. 
Another possible explanation is that this excess of injuries during the hour “zero” of 
work is due to the accumulation of stress and of efforts, either in regular or irregu-
lar work, that make the worker tired even before starting to work. A full estimation 
of the share of regularly employed workers who engage in forms of “gray” work is 
beyond the scope of this paper, yet these statistics provide further indication that for-






The time trends of the foreign-native earning gaps are illustrated in Fig. 2, which 
reports the overall gap (the solid line) along with its explained (dashed) and residual 
unexplained component (dotted). The average foreign-native gap in weekly wages 
is slightly below 30%; it has increased between 1999 and 2009 and stabilized since 
then, like the explained component.
The “residual” component of the gap, i.e. the one that is attributable to the 
migrant worker status, has grown until 2003 and stabilised around 10% since then. 
These results are somewhat smaller but in line with the recent findings in the lit-
erature on the wage gaps of immigrants. Interestingly, no substantial reduction in 
the wage gap seems to occur during recession; this means that job destructions do 













1994 1999 2004 2009
year
overall explained residual
Fig. 2  Trends in average native-migrant earning gaps, 1994–2012. Constant prices, base year 2012. 
Native-immigrant earning gaps are distinguished into: overall (solid), explained by observable character-
istics (dashed), and residual (dotted)
9 This is confirmed in the Appendix section “Robustness checks”, Figs. 7 and 8, where we report the 
entire distributions of wages and wage differentials.
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4.2  Injury risk
To study the distribution of injury risk (Fig.  3), we constructed cells of homoge-
neous characteristics (gender, age class, qualification, family allowances, region of 
work, semesters of tenure, type of contract, sector, firm size and firm age) separately 
for natives and foreigners and computed the average injury risks per cell. Based on 
the range observed over the 18-year period, we assigned the injury rates of each cell 
to 80 risk classes of equal size. Counting the individuals in each cell and each risk 
class, we computed the relative shares of immigrants and natives in each risk class 
over their respective subsamples. Reweighting the count of individuals in each cell 
by the DFL weight and computing the share of each class over the counterfactual 
sample we obtained the counterfactual distribution. Because injuries are rare events, 
the wide majority of our sample concentrates in the zero risk class; to ensure statisti-
cal power in the higher classes, we pooled the data over the 18 years and dropped all 
classes above 10 (i.e. above 3 injuries per person-year; yet, the yearly distributions 
closely resemble the pooled one).
The left panel of Fig. 3 reports the entire distribution for all injuries; the right 
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All injuries, non−zero risk classes
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Fig. 3  Distribution of foreigners, natives and counterfactual by classes of risk. Pooled 1994–2012 injury 
data. Own computation of relative frequencies in WHIP 2015
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Immigrants’ distribution is clearly right-shifted compared to the natives’. If 
natives had the same characteristics as foreigners, their counterfactual distribution 
would also be more right-skewed and we would observe a higher average injury 
risk. Interestingly, though, this explains the greater concentration of immigrants in 
moderate risk classes, but not in high risk classes, which must be attributed to the 
immigrants’ status.
Moving from the distribution to the analysis of average injury rates over time, the 
left panel of Fig. 4 reports the trends in average injury rates for foreigners, natives, 
and counterfactuals.10 Injury rates of foreign workers exceed the natives’ in all years. 
The increase in the injury rates is sharpest for foreigners, during the 1998–2001 
period. Later, injury rates show a gradual reduction that accelerates during the years 
of the economic crisis, especially for foreigners, in accordance with the pro-cyclical 
nature of injuries (e.g. Asfaw et al. 2011; Boone et al. 2011; Boone and van Ours 
2006). Overall, the graph confirms the higher volatility of immigrants’ injury rates 
along the cycle.
An alternative explanation may be that the reduction is driven by underreporting. 
As noted by Boone and van Ours (2006), workers, especially during recessions, may 
underreport their injuries. In principle, if foreign workers are exposed to stronger 
pressure than natives, we may observe more underreporting among them (i.e. a 
larger differential between the overall injury rate and the rate of severe injuries).
Based on our considerations regarding internal validity, we are confident that the 
gaps in severe injury rates that we display in Figs. 9 and 10 in the Appendix can be 
taken as accurate approximations of the real gaps. The distributions of severe work-
place injuries over time, by classes of risk, and by wage deciles are very similar to 
those of overall injuries. This similarity in patterns holds throughout our analyses and 













































Fig. 4  Trends in injury rates and relative risk, 1994–2012. Average yearly injury rates (left) and associ-
ated relative risks (right). Relative risks calculated as ratios of injury rates in the relevant subsamples in 
each year. Overall gap: foreigners to natives; explained: counterfactual to natives; residual: foreigners to 
counterfactual
10 This is equivalent to plotting the coefficients of a Oxaca–Blinder decomposition computed for every 
year (DiNardo 2002; Brunell and DiNardo 2004). The same holds for Fig. 10 in “Appendix”.
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As is standard in the epidemiological literature, we also compute relative risks 
and report them in Fig. 4. This remains higher than 1.75 and close to 2 until 2009. 
The smoothly declining trend in the injury gap (the dashed-dotted line) seems mainly 
due to the gradual reduction in the unexplained component (the dotted line). The 
explained component of the gap (dashed) has remained fairly stable until 2008. The 
decline in the explained component during the recession may be due to a convergence 
in observable characteristics among natives and foreigners during this time, e.g. if 
natives go back into jobs they previously left to foreigners (see also Appendix sec-
tion “Concentration curves”) or if immigrant-specific jobs disappear. Also, it could 
be attributed to the change in the composition of the immigrant population; indeed, 
over the 2000s, the share of foreign workers from Eastern European countries, who 
have very low injury rates, increased sharply (cfr. Bena and Giraudo 2014).
Overall, about 45–50% of the gap in severe injury rates can be attributed to fairly 
stable immigrant-specific factors (a figure which is comparable to the findings in 
Bena and Giraudo 2014, for stratified samples).
Comparing the trends in the wage gaps with those in injury rates between 1997 
and 1999 provides a first indication that our proposed mechanism may be at work.
Between 1997 and 1999 the Italian economy was hit by the domestic effects of the 
South-Eastern Asia crisis. The decline in the wage gap observed over this period is con-
sistent with the results in Biddle and Hamermesh (2013) for the US, who report that, 
besides facing greater employment volatility, African–Americans experience less wage 
discrimination during downturns. These effects, they argue, are attributable to compo-
sitional effects, and to the fact that some workers change their jobs with the recession.
In our setting, too, compositional effects appear important, as the decline in the 
wage gap is almost entirely explained by workers’ observable characteristics. How-
ever, due to the greater rigidity in the Italian labour markets (Devicienti et al. 2019), 
we are tempted to attribute the decline in wage gaps to job destruction rather than 
to job mobility (see also the discussion in Appendix sections “Hazard of exiting 
employment” and “Firm closure”).
In our application, adding workplace injuries to the analysis enriches the set of 
insights that can be drawn. Moreover, in our application, the availability of work-
place injury data enables us to enrich the analysis of how wage gaps change during 
in recessions with the important additional component of workplace safety. Indeed, 
while wage gaps decrease, injury rates increase for both immigrants and natives over 
the considered period. This indicates a general worsening of working conditions 
for all workers—in terms of both wages and workplace safety. Injury rates increase 
comparatively more for immigrants, leading to an increase in the relative risk. This 
implies, in our model, that the observed combinations of wages and workplace 
safety move closer and closer to the corner solution, at which wages are at their min-
imum and risk is high. For marginal workers faced with the most disadvantageous 
combinations, most of which are immigrants, this implies job destruction.
Coherently, the unexplained component of the relative risk increases over the 
same period and drives the overall results. The composition of immigrants in terms 
of countries of origin seems to play a little role in this context, considering that the 
main change observed over the considered period is the decline in the share of West-
ern Europeans, who are not counted among the “high migration pressure” countries.
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4.3  Conditional distributions of risk by wage
To gain further insights on workplace safety differentials, we turn to the joint analy-
sis of the wage and injury gap. Exploiting the main advantage of the DFL approach, 
we construct a distributional counterfactual and study the functional form of the 
joint distribution of wages and injuries for our three considered subsamples (simi-
larly to Barsky et  al. 2002).11 Figure  5 explores the relationship between injuries 
and wages by splitting our subsamples into deciles of weekly wages. This approach 
seems particularly appropriate considering the well known issue of the social gradi-
ent in health, as well as our previous discussion on the empirical negative relation-
ship between wages and injury risk (e.g. Hamermesh 1999a).12
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Fig. 5  Injury rates by weekly wage decile. Male blue collar workers in the manufacturing sector. Deciles 
of the counterfactual distribution obtained by reweighting the distribution of wages prior to calculating 
the deciles. Injury rates and 95% Poisson confidence intervals computed for each decile and each sub-
sample. Union wage floor ranges relevant for the sub period (constant prices, base year 2012) for all 
manufacturing sectors reported as dashed gray lines, as solid lines for the metal-mechanic subsector
11 To ensure statistical power in our injury rates we use deciles instead of 5-percentiles (yet, the results 
are similar when we use 5-percentile ranges as they do).
12 Another tool for the analysis of the social gradient in health is represented by concentration curves 
(Wagstaff et al. 1991; Kakwani et al. 1997) that are studied in Appendix section “Concentration curves” 
(Fig.  25). Our approach seems more flexible since concentration curves are constrained to analyse 
within-group inequalities and are thus of limited insightfulness when analysing the wage and injury gaps.
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To derive the counterfactual distributions, we obtain the quantiles of the counter-
factual (i.e. DFL-reweighted) distribution of wages, then compute the decile-specific 
injury rates, as regards both overall injuries and severe injuries.
In relation to the joint distribution of injuries and wages, the comparability 
between the native and foreign-born groups is particularly important to ensure the 
validity of the results of the DFL decomposition. Hence, in order to maintain the 
weights within a reasonable range and to mitigate unobserved heterogeneity, we 
focus in this analysis on male blue collar workers in the manufacturing sector.
In all figures, the foreigners’ schedule lies above and to the left of the sched-
ule for natives, and in most cases also above the counterfactual. Hence, not only is 
their wage distribution shifted to the left, but, by similar levels of wage, they dis-
play higher injury rates, in line with the interpretation of a segmented labor market 
(Orrenius and Zavodny 2013) and with the hedonic wage model presented above. 
Observable characteristics explain a large part of the gap, but the unexplained com-
ponent is significant at specific wage levels. Another stylized fact emerging from 
our analysis is that the reduction in the overall gap in injury rates observed above 
translates into a gradual reduction of the slopes of the curves over time, leading to 
a very flat distribution in the recession sub-period of 2008–2012. The decline in 
injury rates over time applies to all subsamples but is more marked for foreign-born 
workers. As shown in “Appendix”, the results are robust to a wide set of robustness 
checks. In particular, the results hold when restricting the analysis to severe inju-
ries only—which indicates that the results are not driven by under-reporting of less 
severe injuries, notwithstanding the lower statistical power due to the rarer phenom-
enon at stake (Fig. 11). They are also confirmed and even more marked when we 
restrict the analysis to the subsample of workers having worked the whole year and 
if we study the metal-mechanic sector only, hence a set of workers who are subject 
to a single collective contract (Figs.  13, 14). Results are also robust to excluding 
workers hired during the last month of the year.
Finally, the set of regressors that we include in the probit models that we employ 
to compute our weights may affect our results. In the light of the peculiar role of 
labour market experience plays for injury rates, in Fig. 15, we report the results of 
an additional analysis where the usual set of regressors is augmented with the differ-
ence between a worker’s age and his age at the first recorded employment in Italy.13 
The robustness of these results is reassuring that the large set of regressors that we 
include captures most of the variation in the phenomenon at stake.
Qualitatively similar results are obtained when studying the distribution of annual 
wages rather than weekly wages (Fig. 6); in this case, the results are driven by the 
fact that immigrants are disproportionally employed with shorter contracts. Unsur-
prisingly, this category displays the highest injury rates (among natives as well as 
13 To mitigate collinearity with age, and to allow for the emergence of non-linearities, we include classes 
of labour market experience (less than 1 year, between 1 and 3 years, between 3 and 5 years, between 5 
and 7 years, between 7 and 10 years, above 10 years). As discussed in Appendix section “Factors affect-
ing injury rates”, a word of caveat is of order with respect to this proxy of labour market experience 
for foreign workers, considering that it cannot measure whether the person was at school in Italy, nor 
whether he was previously employed in the informal labour market.
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foreigners), considering that the literature, as well as our own results in Table 2, have 
identified on-the-job tenure among the most significant protective factors against 
workplace injuries. The higher risk among foreigners is consistent with the observed 
concentration of foreigners in less protected jobs with more precarious contracts, 
and is to a large extent attributable to observable characteristics; its marked decline 
in 2008–2012 could be attributed to the job destruction operated by the global finan-
cial downturn which affected non-tenured contracts more heavily.
More generally, all figures clearly show the empirically negative relationship 
between wages and injury risk that is discussed in the literature and that confirms 
that lower-wage workers are at higher injury risk. Yet, the injury rates of foreign-
ers are significantly higher than the natives’ and the counterfactual’s even by higher 
wages.
We observe a marked change in the slope of the curves at wage levels corre-
sponding to ca. 18,000 Euros yearly, an amount compatible with the minimum level 
of earnings set by collective bargaining for most manufacturing sub-sectors, whose 
range is indicated by the gray bars in the figures. Within the range of the union 
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Fig. 6  Injury rates by annual wage decile; all injuries. Male blue collar workers in the manufacturing 
sector. Deciles of the counterfactual distribution obtained by reweighting the distribution of wages prior 
to calculating the deciles. Injury rates and 95% Poisson confidence intervals computed for each decile 
and each subsample. Union wage floor ranges relevant for the sub period (constant prices, base year 




between foreigners and counterfactual.14 Above these levels, as wages grow, injury 
rates decline monotonically.
The wage levels for the lowest deciles appear to decline over time in real terms, 
and more markedly so for foreign workers. This may be attributed to the labor market 
reform introduced in 2003, that increased the share of workers employed with non-
standard contracts, hence not subject to the collective bargaining provisions. None-
theless, the excess of risk in correspondence to the contractual wage floor still applies 
even if we restrict the analysis to workers with standard open-ended contracts.
Overall, the injury gaps between foreigners and natives seems mainly driven by two 
facts: the higher injury rates observed in the lowest wage quantiles, which exceed sig-
nificantly the level predicted by observed characteristics at union wage floor levels; and 
the persistently higher injury rates observed for higher quantiles. The gaps are largest 
and most significant in the 1998–2002 and 2003–2007 sub periods. The estimates are 
less precise but qualitatively similar in the 1994–1998 sub-period, where immigration 
in Italy was still a new phenomenon, hence we have less observations for migrants.
5  Discussion
The analysis confirmed that the combined injury and wage gap faced by foreign-
ers is not entirely due to differences in the observable characteristics, and that a 
non-negligible component in the wage and risk gap remains attributable to the 
unobserved characteristics of immigrants.
According to our results, the unexplained foreign workers earning gap 
amounted in the more recent years to ca. 10% of average wages. Even controlling 
for observable characteristics, foreign workers’ injury risk exceeds that of natives 
by between 16 and 37%. The picture is even more serious when looking at severe 
injuries, as the corresponding excess risk is between 24 and 47%. As mentioned, 
as we are only considering workers employed with regular contracts and serious 
injuries are not subject to reporting bias, we may take the latter as a credible esti-
mate of the actual gap in workplace safety.
The analysis of the injury rate conditional on wage showed that the greatest and 
most significant component of the gap is localised at the union wage floor level set 
by collective bargaining. The excess of injuries of foreign workers in proximity of 
14 No single minimum wage threshold exists in Italy. Wage floors are set by collective bargaining in 
different sub-sectors and are updated yearly. The wide majority of regular workers, either with open-
ended and fixed-term contracts, working in firms of all sizes and excluding only those with non-standard 
contracts, are subject to such thresholds. The values of the wage floors used in this study are drawn from 
Card et  al. (2014) for 1995–2001 and are updated for the following years with the publicly available 
data provided yearly at www.dottr inala voro.it. In each sub period, the lower and upper bounds (dashed 
gray lines) correspond to the lowest and highest observed minimum wage level set by collective bargain-
ing for blue collar workers in manufacturing sectors (respectively: professional category level 2, textile 
sector, small-sized firms, hand-made and hand-woven production jobs; and professional category level 
E3, chemical sector, large-sized firms). Because a majority of workers subject to contracts in collective 
bargaining are in the metal-mechanic subsector, we also include their minimum wage ranges over the 




the threshold could be explained within the framework of the hedonic wage model 
introduced in Sect. 2. As we discussed, for different reasons, the “unrestricted” wage 
that employers would offer in absence of minima would possibly be located below 
the threshold. Collective bargaining, however, imposes them to pay the minimum. 
Hence, employers need to move to a higher bundle of wage and injury risk; their 
increased expenditure for wages needs to be counterbalanced by a lower expendi-
ture for safety. This unintended risk-increasing effect of the wage floor is compat-
ible with previous findings by Leombruni et al. (2013) who showed that, due to the 
downward rigidity of wages, human capital losses due to displacement translate into 
greater risk and not into wage losses. According to this interpretation, lower-skilled 
immigrants would result as marginal workers, employed at a corner solution.
Hence, employer-driven segmentation in a wage-rigid labor market may be 
among the determinants of the higher risk born by foreign workers, adding up 
to possibly heterogeneous risk preferences between natives and immigrants. If 
the underlying labor supply curve is differentiated between natives and foreign-
ers (cfr. Viscusi and Hersch 2001), employing foreigners may be a way to save 
on labor costs, including on safety costs. In turn, selection effects determined by 
workers’ and firms’ heterogeneity may cause foreign workers to be more subject 
to fluctuations in the macroeconomic conditions than other workers.
When the economy is in a bad state, the bundles of wages and injury risk that the 
firm can offer shift to lower wages and higher risk. The downward rigidity of wages 
constrains the wage cuts and may induce firms to save on safety, rather than wages, 
to the extent that the implied level of risk may become legally unaffordable. Hence, 
recessions may cause workers to disappear from the formal labor market. Their dis-
appearance reduces exposure in addition to the reduction in the work pace that, per 
se, reduces injuries and would explain the observed decline in injury rates.
Furthermore, within the same job/firm, the isoprofit curve associated with more 
productive workers would decrease less than the isoprofit curve associated with less 
productive workers. Hence, the flattening of the curves in Figs. 5 and 6 may be due 
to a selection effect which destroys the jobs located at the corner solutions. Only 
the jobs for the (unobservably) more productive workers would remain, making the 
negative relation between salary and risk less evident than it was in previous years.
This interpretation is supported in a set of duration analyses performed on the 
hazard of exiting employment reported in Appendix section “Hazard of exiting 
employment”. Foreign workers are found to face significantly higher hazard than 
natives. The hazard of loosing jobs increases with regional unemployment rates, 
while wage levels are found to have a significant protective effect.
A second selection mechanism that may lead to the observed reduction in migrants’ 
injury rates could depend on the distribution of firms’ unobserved attributes (i.e. not 
controlled for in our reweighting procedure) and may thus be determined by changes 
in the composition of employers over the business cycle. In a set of tobit regressions 
on synthethic firms (see Appendix section “Firm closure”), we show that firms charac-
terized by lower average wages, higher injury risk and a higher percentage of foreign 
workers are more likely to close during the time of the Great Recession.
Both selection mechanisms make foreign workers more likely to experience job 
losses and thus contribute to explain the overall observed reduction in migrants’ 
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injury rates. Such a decrease, however, concerns only jobs observed in the formal 
sector. As shown by Leombruni et  al. (2019), workers are more likely to exit the 
formal labor market and to undertake jobs in the informal sector during recessions, 
with even more serious implications for their workplace safety.
Another possible explanation for the observed patterns relates to job intensity. 
If foreigners are assigned to more effort-intensive tasks (not captured by our vari-
ables), during recession the overall decline in job intensity would decrease foreign-
ers’ injuries comparatively more than natives’, particularly in the lower deciles. The 
alternative argument that during recessions severe injury rates remain unchanged but 
underreporting increases (Boone and van Ours 2006) is not supported in the joint 
analysis of injury rates by wage: aggregate and severe injuries display very similar 
patterns. In a set of unreported analyses, we plotted the ratio of severe to aggregate 
injuries by wage decile in the four sub-periods, without detecting any significant 
increase among the lower-waged foreign workers.
A limitation of this work is that within the present design we cannot tell the 
effects of potentially opposing factors, such as the change in the composition of the 
immigrant population, from the effects of the crisis which may actually increase the 
incentives to underreport, as suggested by Boone and van Ours (2006). In particular, 
from 2006 on, the foreign-born population of Romanian origin, known to have pecu-
liarly low injury rates (Bena and Giraudo 2014), has been gaining the leading share 
of the foreign population.
To gain insights on possible compositional effects, in Appendix section “Composi-
tional effects” we run separate analyses for the two most represented national origins of 
foreign workers, i.e., Morocco and Romania, and apply our methodology to a subsample 
that excludes Romanian workers. The results for the single nationalities (Figs. 21, 22) 
reveal opposing patterns. In 2008–2012, Moroccan workers display a downward shift 
in injury rates that is comparable to that of foreign-born workers as a whole. Roma-
nian workers, instead, who are characterised by lower-than-average injury rates (hence 
are possibly less marginal than Moroccans), do not change their position significantly. 
Reassuringly, however, the results for the sample that excludes Romanian workers are 
remarkably similar to our main results. Hence, the decrease in foreigners’ injury rates 
may be attributed to the combined effect of the job destruction faced by marginal work-
ers/firms and the increased weight of the Romanian workers, where, however, the role of 
compositional effects seems to be limited and the job destruction effects of macroeco-
nomic changes seem to prevail. Indeed, their relatively skilled profile ensures that Roma-
nian workers are not heavily represented among the lowest-wage/highest-risk deciles.
As regards foreign workers with greater wage potential, we still observe injury 
rates that significantly exceed the level predicted by observable characteristics. Even 
in the higher-wage part of the distribution, injury rates decline as salary increases, 
but this decline less marked for foreigners. Moreover, their observable characteris-
tics would predict a sharper decline than is actually observed. Overall, the immi-
grant status seems to affect injury rates even by workers with greater wage potential.
Overall, the immigrant status seems associated with a reduced ability to buy safety 
in exchange of wages. Additional evidence presented in “Appendix” suggests that, 
among foreigners, the within-group distribution of injuries by wage is fairly equal and 
almost close to perfect equality in the 2007–2012 sub-period (Fig. 25). Conversely, 
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natives display concentration of injuries by lower wages. Hence, as salary increases, 
natives are able, to greater extent than immigrants, to raise workplace safety as well.
6  Conclusions
Comparing counterfactual scenarios for natives with the actual distributions of 
immigrants reveals a strong labor market segmentation where differentials in wages 
and injury risks cannot be attributed to observable characteristics.
Our focus on the joint distribution of injuries and wages highlights novel aspects 
of the unequal distribution of injuries by wage. On the one hand, lower-skilled 
migrants are marginal workers enduring worse working conditions at any level of 
wages; on the other hand, they face greater risk of losing their jobs during recession. 
This leads the overall gap in injury rates in the formal sector to decrease over time. 
As a matter of fact, our results show that workplace safety, wages and employment 
are closely interconnected and that their dynamics should be analyzed jointly.
The analysis of the shape of these joint distributions around minimum con-
tractual wages and the regressions on firm closures suggest that the injury gap 
and its dynamics may also be affected by unobserved heterogeneous attributes 
of employers. Unfortunately, as commonly acknowledged by analyses on hedonic 
models (Rosen 1974), the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in workers and 
employers’ attributes does not allow us to disentangle the effects due to firms’ 
productivity from those entailed by tasted-based or monopsonistic discrimination 
(Manning 2003). Whatever the source of this heterogeneity, our findings are sug-
gestive that the greater risk borne by immigrants is related to their overrepresen-
tation in “worse” (i.e. riskier, less productive) firms.
Equality concerns, therefore, strongly point to the need to shed light and to inter-
vene on the sources of such a concentration of workplace risk. Currently, the agency 
in charge for workplace safety monitoring in Italy (SPRESAL) intervenes either ran-
domly or upon request by concerned employees. According to our results, firms dis-
playing a peculiar concentration of low wages may be considered to be at high risk 
and stricter monitoring may be foreseen for their case. Stricter enforcement of the 
safety monitoring implies, in Italy, that concerned firms will, as a minimum, have 
to prepare a “Risk Assessment” document that enumerates the potential sources of 
risk along with the interventions to mitigate it. Such a document is currently not 
implemented by all firms. This may be important in understanding whether the haz-
ard comes from individual conduct (e.g., the need to improve the use of individual 
protection equipment) or from the organization of the production process (e.g., if the 
pace of work is too fast to ensure compliance with the safety standards).
On the other hand, as mentioned, workers trade-off safety for wages. This sug-
gests that the overall welfare effects of a strong enforcement of a minimum level of 
safety conditions, combined with minimum contractual wages, are a priori ambigu-
ous. As emphasized by the literature on monopsony (Bhaskar and To 1999; Manning 
2003), these restrictions may lead to firms exit, and this may represent, especially 
for immigrants, a strong reduction in work opportunities. In addition, the destruction 
of formal jobs recorded by administrative datasets may be followed by an increased 
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participation of foreign workers in the informal sector, where the workplace safety 
conditions are plausibly even worse. It is possible that, especially during downturns, 
more liquidity-constrained workers would increase their tolerance to workplace risk 
and to irregular contracts. Downturns may also affect firms’ ability to offer contracts 
that comply with the legal standards in safety and wages, and more generally to 
invest in safety. We envisage in this regard an important role for public intervention 
either in the form of income support measures or in direct support for regular firms, 
along with ever-needed measures to fight informal labour markets.
Our study also indicates the need that future studies address the safety impact of pol-
icies aiming to reduce informality, so as to get a more reliable appreciation of the extent 
to which our results underestimated workplace injuries in informal labour markets.
As regards the investigation of the sources of the concentration of workplace risk, 
we showed that labour market experience has opposite effects on workplace safety 
for natives and foreigners, with immigrants’ safety conditions worsening over time. 
As discussed, this may be the result of cumulative and self-reinforcing effects of the 
initial allocation of immigrants to dangerous tasks, that increasingly segregates these 
workers into risky and lower-wage tasks. This may occur because, at the beginning, 
they master the language less well and are not equally able to implement correct safety 
behaviours. Similarly to what has been observed for wage gaps, this initial downgrad-
ing may reduce the motivation for the worker to invest in language and skills upgrad-
ing (Hammarstedt 2006; Kee 1995; Lee and Wolpin 2006; Angioloni and Wu 2020). 
This is also in line with the results by Bena and Giraudo (2014), who find that tenure 
does not moderate the high injury risk faced by Moroccan workers in Italy.
These dynamics imply skill downgrading and mismatch for foreign workers that are 
to some extent avoidable. While mismatch is the result from the complex interaction of 
demand and supply dynamics, the language difficulties of newcomers can be addressed 
via early language trainings. Enrolment in a language training could become a require-
ment for the renewal of the ordinary stay permits and not only for the long-term per-
mit, as it is currently the case. Proficiency in the Italian language can be expected to 
improve the ability of foreign workers to understand and comply with safety regula-
tions, coherently with the findings by Orrenius and Zavodny (2013) who found that 
language proficiency is a key protective factor against injury risk. Language proficiency 
can be expected to improve the quality of the matching process between workers and 
firms, which is a socially desirable result for a country competing for skilled labour 
with other countries. Parallel to this, it seems crucial that all firms implement adequate 
safety trainings, and that such implementation is carefully monitored.
More generally, even if we showed different behaviours for natives and foreigners, 
the first year of employment appears critical for both groups of workers—for immi-
grants, because it triggers self-reinforcing effects later on; for natives, because it rep-
resents the year with greatest risk of injury. Hence, elements of safety training may 
become part of the curricula of professional and technical schools. Considering that 
many students with foreign origins attend these schools, this would serve the double 
purpose of promoting safety training among early entrants in the labour market, and 
of promoting its knowledge among future workers with a migration background.
A side-result of our analysis is, finally, to highlight the need to accelerate the 
process of harmonisation of data collection on workplace injuries, an effort that is 
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in place in the EU within the ESAW project (European Statistics on Accidents at 
Work), and possibly to extend it beyond the EU. While, at least in the EU, there 
seems to be consensus regarding the need to collect comparable and reliable data on 
workplace injuries, the available information regarding immigrant workers remains 
scant, which adds to even more serious lacks of data on workplace injuries in the 
countries of origin. Even recognising the difficulties in comparing data stemming 
from different insurance systems, collected with different criteria and diffused with 
different methods (Mekkodathil et al. 2016), such an effort would have substantial 
implications. It would help to disentangle whether the gaps in injury rates between 
natives and foreigners can be explained by home country specificities (e.g., general 
levels of education, a specific industrial culture that makes some groups more sensi-
tive to safety issues) or by differential and potentially discriminatory treatment of 
specific groups in the country of destination.
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Table 1  Summary statistics Source: WHIP 2015
 Year Natives Migrants
1994 2003 2012 1994 2003 2012
Annual Wage (avg.) Injuries 16,954.09 17,120.11 21,441.39 11,528.06 10,432.38 13,444.52
Injury rate (%): all injuries 6.47 6.52 3.78 9.30 10.97 5.47
Injury rate (%): severe injuries 0.57 0.67 0.42 1.10 1.15 0.67
Lost days of work (avg.) 1.57 2.24 1.38 2.15 3.37 1.90
Sector (%)
Mining and quarrying 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.65 0.29 0.22
Manufacturing 40.65 40.84 35.62 40.41 37.76 33.63
Electricity, gas, water supply 4.68 1.41 1.25 1.31 0.09 0.09
Construction 12.68 15.08 12.73 16.32 25.04 19.20
Wholesale and retail trade; repair 9.40 14.11 16.23 8.22 7.16 8.91
Accommodation and food 
service
2.96 4.22 5.82 13.16 7.00 10.85
Transporting and storage 11.55 7.98 7.93 7.02 7.27 7.99
Financial and insurance 10.74 9.56 12.77 5.43 11.51 14.28
Real estate, ICT, professional, 
scientific
1.64 1.35 1.12 2.79 1.48 1.43
Education 0.77 1.04 1.63 0.67 0.48 0.81
Human health and social work 1.20 1.20 1.42 0.94 0.55 0.71
Administration 2.23 1.96 2.27 2.22 1.06 1.50
Age (avg.) 39.11 37.61 40.86 34.44 34.57 37.91
Tenure (avg.) 5.40 5.52 7.14 2.63 1.63 3.37
Firm age (avg.) 0.19 3.44 3.61 3.46 2.83 3.00
Type of contract (%)
Open-ended 95.87 84.04 80.18 94.68 79.51 72.86
Seasonal 0.82 0.70 1.01 1.20
Fixed-term 6.41 12.98 10.96 18.51
Training and work contract 2.12 1.70 3.53 0.86
Temp work 1.50 1.69 3.94 2.83
Apprenticeship 2.00 5.53 4.44 1.79 3.71 4.60
Firm size (%)
0–9 16.78 27.67 28.19 31.99 40.58 37.41
10–19 6.92 12.63 12.32 11.60 15.03 15.42
20–199 21.41 31.24 30.46 26.80 30.46 32.24
200–999 15.24 13.42 13.55 11.85 6.93 8.28
≥1000 39.65 15.04 15.49 17.76 7.00 6.65
Region of work (%)
North 36.38 44.15 43.06 50.26 60.59 56.67
Centre 28.41 27.22 27.43 32.39 31.06 32.80
South and Islands 35.21 28.63 29.51 17.36 8.35 10.53
Qualification (%)
Apprentice 2.00 5.53 4.44 1.79 3.71 4.60
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Factors affecting injury rates
In Table 2, we report the factors that correlate most strongly with injury risks. To 
this end, we have run a set of probit regressions of the probability to get injured 
during the job spell on a set of worker- and firm-level determinants (2-digit NACE 
sectoral dummies, year dummies, region of work, log exposure, firm size and its 
quadratic term, type of contract, age, on-the-job tenure, and labour market experi-
ence). Along with age and tenure, in order to study the possible sources of gaps, we 
include labour market experience, measured as the difference between a worker’s 
age and his age at first recorded employment.15 Indeed, the presence of learning 
effects in relation to workplace safety may yield policy-relevant insights. We do not 
include wage in the specifications due to the mentioned endogeneity concerns. We 
run our analysis for natives and foreign workers separately, restricting the analysis to 
male blue collar workers in the manufacturing sector, and we replicate them for both 
overall injuries (Columns 1–4) and severe injuries only (Columns 5–8). The results 
are very similar when the analysis is implemented via a set of Poisson or Negative 
Binomial regressions, where the dependent variable is the number of (severe) inju-
ries by job spell, so they are not reported but are available upon request.
The results unambiguously indicate the protective effects of on-the-job tenure and 
of open-ended contracts. Workers having spent a longer time within the same work 
relationship and employed with open-ended contracts are significantly less likely to 
get injured. As to age, the results indicate that older workers tend to experience inju-
ries less frequently, but that they are more exposed to severe injuries. This suggests 
that age, presumably due to experience and knowledge of the tasks, allows workers 
to prevent the occurrence of less severe injuries, but that ageing may be detrimental 
for job safety if it entails a deterioration in the physical abilities that workers need to 
perform safely at work. Interestingly, labour market experience appears to have dif-
ferent effects for foreign and native workers.
To gain further insights, we compute marginal effects and report them in Table 3. 
Conditional on tenure and age, labour market experience is positively correlated 
with the probability to get injured for foreigners, and negative but insignificant for 
natives. This is the case for both overall and severe injuries (Columns 1–2 and 5–6). 
To gain further insights on these results, in Columns 3–4 and 7–8 we replace labour 
15 We would like to thank an anonimous referee for suggesting this analysis.
Table 1  (continued)
 Year Natives Migrants
1994 2003 2012 1994 2003 2012
Blue collar 60.90 66.68 65.30 79.95 92.32 90.96
White collar 37.10 27.80 30.26 18.26 3.97 4.45
Nro. of observations 120,634 470,343 434,505 5098 111,085 135,292


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































market experience with a categorical variable indicating “classes” of labour market 
experience (<1 year, 1–3, 3–5 years, 5–7 years, 7–10 years, and > 10 years, the ref-
erence category). In the case of foreigners, the results indicate a monotonic increase 
in the risk of injury as experience increases. Instead, the case of natives seems more 
aligned with the presence of learning effects, and suggest that the risk of injury is 
highest when the worker has just entered the labour market and decreases after-
wards. The results are qualitatively similar for the case of severe injuries.
There may be different reasons why, instead, when the labour market experi-
ence of foreign workers increases, their risk of injury increases, too. First, we must 
remember that, by construction, labour market experience depends on the age at first 
employment. While, for natives, the interpretation of this “entry age” is relatively 
homogeneous, for foreign workers the variable covers at the same time the entry 
in the labour force and in the formal employment in Italy. Given that the previous 
period is unobservable to us, workers with a similar entry age may be quite different 
if, for instance, one has studied in Italy and the other not. Yet, if there are learning 
effects on the workplace, these should be additive to the learning effects on Ital-
ian labour market, and should translate into an overall decline in the injury rates as 
experience increases. Because our data robustly show an increase, instead, an alter-
native explanation must be found.
To this end, we draw on some key arguments in the literature on native-migrant 
wage gap (Dustmann et al. 2012; Kee 1995), that argue that wage gaps are largely 
due to skill downgrading, which is initially associated with administrative, cul-
tural and language difficulties in transferring education from home to the destina-
tion country, but that triggers cumulative and self-reinforcing effects as it erodes 
the worker’s motivation to invest in skills upgrading (Hammarstedt 2006; Lee and 
Wolpin 2006; Angioloni and Wu 2020). Similarly, the increasing risk that workers 
face as their experience grows may be due to cumulative effects: if it is perceived 
that safety investments are less effective for foreign workers, e.g., because they mas-
ter the language less well and are not equally able to correctly implement safety 
behaviours, these workers may end up being increasingly segregated into more risky 
and lower-wage tasks. This initial downgrading may reduce the motivation for the 
worker to invest in language and skills upgrading. This is in line with the results by 
Bena and Giraudo (2014), who find that tenure does not moderate the high injury 
risk faced by Moroccan workers in Italy.
Another possible interpretation is that, conditional on age and tenure, labour mar-
ket experience effectively measures the age at entry. Ceteris paribus, longer labour 
market experience would indicate an earlier entry age, which to some extent may be 
considered to proxy for the highest educational level attained. Less educated work-
ers would then experience greater injury risk in the long run. While this may seem 
a plausible alternative explanation, we are inclined to discard it. First, these argu-
ments should apply even more strongly to the case of natives, considering that in 
their case, the institutional context is homogeneous and entry age may be a more 
accurate proxy of education. However, as discussed, we detect the opposite pattern 
for them. Second, the average entry age of immigrants is relatively high (about 30 
years for the most represented countries in most years, see Fig. 19), which suggests 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in the informal labour market. Further exploring this interpretation would require 
detailed administrative data on the entry age in the immigrants countries of origin, 
which are unfortunately unavailable to us.
Robustness checks


































Fig. 7  Wage densities. Kernel density functions for weekly wages for foreigners and natives; counterfac-




























































Fig. 8  Differences in wage densities. Differences in wage densities as Kernel density functions of the 
differences in the Kernel wage density functions between foreigners and natives (overall); natives and 
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Fig. 9  Distribution of foreigners, natives and counterfactual by classes of risk. Pooled 1994–2012 injury 














































Fig. 10  Trends in injury rates and relative risk for severe injuries, 1994–2012. Severe injuries only. Aver-
age yearly injury rates (left) and associated relative risks (right). Relative risks calculated as ratios of 
injury rates in the relevant subsamples in each year. Overall gap: foreigners to natives; explained: coun-



























































































































































Fig. 11  Injury rates by weekly wage decile; severe injuries. Male blue collar workers in the manufactur-
ing sector. Deciles of the counterfactual distribution obtained by reweighting the distribution of wages 
prior to calculating the deciles. Injury rates and 95% Poisson confidence intervals computed for each 
decile and each subsample. Union wage floor ranges relevant for the sub period (constant prices, base 





In this section, we address the hypothesis that immigrants’ employment be dispro-
portionately vulnerable to economic downturns.
To this end, we study the hazard of exiting employment via a set Weibull 
regressions with and without Gamma frailty, first without and then including 
region and year dummies. All specifications include controls for firm size and 
dummies for firm age, industry, region, year, workers’ age class, qualification, 
and contract type.
The results are reported in Table  5. Foreign workers are found to face sig-
nificantly higher hazard than natives. The hazard of loosing jobs increases with 
regional unemployment rates, while wage levels are found to have a significant 
protective effect (columns 1 and 5).
When we include region and year dummies (columns 2 and 6), the coefficient 
of unemployment becomes negative, suggesting a “protective” effect against the 
hazard of exiting employment. In interpreting these coefficients, however, we 
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Fig. 12  Injury rates by annual wage decile; severe injuries. Male blue collar workers in the manufactur-
ing sector. Deciles of the counterfactual distribution obtained by reweighting the distribution of wages 
prior to calculating the deciles. Injury rates for severe injuries and 95% Poisson confidence intervals 
computed for each decile and each subsample. Union wage floor ranges relevant for the sub period (con-




region over the considered period, and on the average unemployment rates of Ital-
ian regions every year.
In columns 3–4 and 7–8, we interact the immigrant dummy with the log of 
wage and with unemployment, to study whether unemployment shocks are 
absorbed by immigrants and natives to a different extent, and whether our hypoth-
esis that immigrants with lower wages tend to be at higher risk of exiting employ-
ment is supported in the data. The results confirm that foreign workers are at 
greater hazard of exiting employment than natives. Moreover, the results indi-
cate that periods of recession increase the risk of exiting employment for foreign 
workers (columns 3 and 7), and that workers with low wages are face higher haz-
ard (columns 4 and 8). Here again, the conditional net effect of unemployment for 
natives is negative, while the conditional net effect of unemployment for immi-
grants is positive, which suggests that that the residual shocks on unemployment 
that are not explained by time and region variation are absorbed by immigrants 
more than by natives.
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Fig. 13  Injury rates by weekly wage decile, workers having worked 12 months/year; all injuries. Male 
blue collar workers in the manufacturing sector. Deciles of the counterfactual distribution obtained by 
reweighting the distribution of wages prior to calculating the deciles. Injury rates for severe injuries and 
95% Poisson confidence intervals computed for each decile and each subsample. Union wage floor ranges 
relevant for the sub period (constant prices, base year 2012) for all manufacturing sectors reported as 




The factual distributions of immigrants have been compared to counterfactual 
distribution of natives constructed using firms’ observable characteristics such as 
size, age, sectoral dummies, region and type of contract. The observed reduction 
in injury gap observed during recession may, however, be driven by unobservable 
attributes. As noted in Sect.  2, the worse labor conditions of migrants may be 
determined by lower productivity of firms hiring them and/or lower investiments 
in safety.
It is thus worth investigating whether the reduction in injury gap follows from 
a compositional effect related to firm closure. To this end, we have conducted an 
analysis on the probability of firm closure using synthetic firms. We cannot esti-
mate regressions using individual firms’ injury rates since workplace accidents, 
especially for small employers, are rare events. Considering that also the num-
ber of firm closures is not high, this would negatively affect the power of our 
estimates.
We have, thus, aggregated firms belonging to the manufacturing sector in cells 
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Fig. 14  Workers in the metal-mechanic sub-sector (weekly wages), All injuries. Injury rates by annual 
wage decile of male blue collar workers in the metal-mechanic subsector over the four sub periods 
(workers having worked the whole year only). Deciles of the counterfactual distribution obtained by 
reweighting the distribution of wages prior to calculating the deciles. Injury rates and 95% Poisson con-
fidence intervals computed for each decile and each subsample. Union wage floor ranges relevant for the 
sub period (constant prices, base year 2012) for the metal-mechanic subsector reported as solid gray lines
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digit), province of work, firm size class (0–9, 10–19, 20–199, 200–999, ≥ 1000 ) 
in the 2005–2008 period. For each cell we have added the cases of administrative 
firm closure recorded by INPS. This index thus represents a cell-specific prob-
ability of firm closure. This measure is then regressed on industry and province 
fixed effects and on the following average characteristics of the firms within the 
same cells: average weekly earnings (computed as the ratio between total earn-
ings and the number of weeks worked on a full time equivalent scale, measured 
in thousands of euro), share of foreign workers, share of women, share of newly 
hired workers, average firm age, log average size, injury rate (measured as the 
ratio of the number of injuries measured in the cell to the total effective weeks of 
work, i.e. excluding weeks of sickness and maternity leave), average tenure.
To take into account the censored nature of the cell-specific probability of firm 
closure, we have estimated a Tobit specification with frequency weights. This analy-
sis must be intended as a descriptive analysis, that by no means intends to uncover 
causal effects.
The estimation results, shown in Table 6, indicate that firms with more foreign 
workers, lower wages, and higher injury risk are more likely to close.
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Fig. 15  Weights estimated using labour market experience, All injuries. Injury rates by annual wage 
decile of male blue collar workers over the four sub periods. The weights are calculated based on a modi-
fied set of probit models that include a proxy for labour market experience (i.e., age–age at first recorded 
employment in Italy) among the regressors. Deciles of the counterfactual distribution obtained by 
reweighting the distribution of wages prior to calculating the deciles. Injury rates and 95% Poisson con-
fidence intervals computed for each decile and each subsample. Union wage floor ranges relevant for the 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As anticipated in Sect. 3, it is important to carefully analyse the extent to which 
compositional effects drive our results. Indeed, to the extent that compositional 
effects can be captured by observable characteristics, they do not pose a problem 
to our analysis; instead, if changes in the composition drive changes in unobserv-
able characteristics, they will affect the validity of our analysis.
Table 6  Probability of firm closure during recession, synthetic firms
Tobit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01.
Regressions refer to synthetic firms identified by homogeneous cells of sector, class
of firm size and province of work in 2005–2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var: Probability to close during the recession
Share women 0.017 0.055*** 0.042** 0.079*** 0.052***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Share Newly hired 0.211*** 0.232*** 0.203*** 0.221*** 0.207***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Average firm age − 0.005*** − 0.005*** − 0.005*** − 0.005*** − 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average tenure 0.000* 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log firm size − 0.012*** − 0.017*** − 0.012*** − 0.016*** − 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Weekly wage − 0.318*** − 0.276*** − 0.278***
(0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
Injury rate 10.025*** 9.571*** 9.747***
(3.447) (3.440) (3.428)
Share foreigners 0.093*** 0.104*** 0.091***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Constant 0.207** 0.088 0.177** 0.071 0.163**
(0.080) (0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.080)
Sigma
Constant 1.451*** 1.455*** 1.447*** 1.450*** 1.446***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
N 4023 4023 4023 4023 4023
AIC − 2316.168 − 2299.243 − 2334.320 − 2323.148 − 2340.386
BIC − 1427.899 − 1410.974 − 1439.751 − 1428.579 − 1439.517
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Frequency weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Fig. 16  Share of foreign workers by world area of origin. Share of foreign workers by world area of ori-
gin by year in our sample
Fig. 17  Share of foreign workers employed in manufacturing by world area of origin. Share of foreign 
workers employed in manufacturing by world area of origin and by year in our sample
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We will illustrate this point by taking the example that, after the EU acces-
sion of Romania and Bulgaria, the immigrant population becomes younger. Our 
weights are calculated separately for every year in the sample. Hence, a different 
composition of immigrants by age will be reflected in a different coefficient of 
age in the probit model that we use to compute the weights, and the associated 
weights will reflect the importance of a specific age group in the immigrant popu-
lation for a specific year. Overall, then, comparing the observed distribution with 
the counterfactual distribution will yield valid results.
However, a different composition of immigrants along characteristics that are 
unobservable in our setting may pose a problem. If, for instance, Romanian and 
Moroccan workers have a different mastery of the Italian language, and Romanians 
increase relative to Moroccans, the unobservable characteristic “language mastery” 
will change over time. If this has a systematic effect on the overall balance of the 
foreign workers’ profile, it should be reflected in a change in the residual component 
of our decomposition and will get confounded with the residual effect of “being an 
immigrant”.
It is important to devote closer scrutiny to this possibility, considering that the 
composition of immigrants in terms of countries of origin has changed significantly 
over the considered period, with a marked increase in the share of Eastern European 
and South-East Asian workers, and a decrease in the share of workers from Western 




Europe and North America (see Fig 16), in the context of an increasing absolute 
size of the immigrant population. Among these, Romania and China stand out as 
the most frequent countries of origin of each area. Because workers from Romania, 
Fig. 19  Average age of workers at labour market entry by world area of origin. Average age of workers at 
labour market entry by world area of origin
Fig. 20  World regions and countries of origin of foreign workers by level of education. World regions 
and countries of origin of foreign workers by level of education. Own elaborations based on the subset of 
OECD-DIOC data on Italy
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in particular, display particularly low injury rates (see Fig. 21) and constitute a sub-
stantial share of all foreign workers in Italy (about 20%), their increasing size may 
drive the reduction in the injury gaps observed during the last subperiod. Accord-
ingly, the shares of Eastern European and South-East Asian workers employed in 
manufacturing sectors increase and offset the decrease of Western Europeans, with 
the relative sizes of the other origin areas remaining virtually unaffected (Fig. 17).
Yet, the composition by countries of origin does not seem to be the main driver 
of the changes in the gaps in injury rates between foreign workers and natives over 
time.
First, as shown in Figs. 4 and 10, the residual component in the average relative 
risks of foreign workers vs. natives does not show substantial variation from 1999 
on, and it only shows a slight decline in 2007.
Second, along observable characteristics, Eastern European and South-East-
Asian workers are broadly aligned with the rest of the areas of origin, not indicating 
a peculiar profile for these workers. In particular, looking the differences between 
age and age at first employment in Italy may yield insights as to the role of labour 
market experience in explaining injury rates (Figs. 18, 19). The distribution of age 
Fig. 21  Injury rates by weekly wage decile, Romanian workers only, All injuries. Injury rates by annual 
wage decile of male blue collar workers in the metal-mechanic subsector over the four sub periods 
(workers having worked the whole year only). Deciles of the counterfactual distribution obtained by 
reweighting the distribution of wages prior to calculating the deciles. Injury rates and 95% Poisson con-
fidence intervals computed for each decile and each subsample. Union wage floor ranges relevant for the 
sub period (constant prices, base year 2012) for the metal-mechanic subsector reported as solid gray lines
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at entry is significantly different between natives and foreign-born workers, but rela-
tively homogeneous within the group of foreign workers (Figs. 18, 19). Similarly, 
while the average age is quite different between foreigners and natives, the trends 
in the average age of Eastern European workers appear broadly aligned with those 
of the other foreign workers (see also next point). Similar results are obtained when 
focusing on the 6 most represented nationalities (Figs. 20, 21).
Third, the main results of our analysis (the excess in injuries observed for this 
subgroup of workers, its concentration in the lower wage deciles, and the decline in 
the gap over time which we attribute to job destruction) are robust not only to focus-
ing on the single largest nationality group, i.e. Morocco (Fig.  22), but also when 
we perform our analyses on a subsample that excludes Romanian workers (Fig. 23). 
This is important considering that, in spite of the encouraging considerations, it may 
be that workers are systematically different along characteristics that are unobserv-
able in our data.
For instance, language mastery (Orrenius and Zavodny 2013) and education 
may play a role in affecting injury rates. Given the proximity of the Romanian lan-
guage with the Italian one, language similarity may play a role. Moreover, OECD-
DIOC data suggest that Romanian workers are relatively more educated than other 
Fig. 22  Injury rates by weekly wage decile, Moroccan workers only, All injuries. Injury rates by annual 
wage decile of male blue collar workers in the metal-mechanic subsector over the four sub periods 
(workers having worked the whole year only). Deciles of the counterfactual distribution obtained by 
reweighting the distribution of wages prior to calculating the deciles. Injury rates and 95% Poisson con-
fidence intervals computed for each decile and each subsample. Union wage floor ranges relevant for the 
sub period (constant prices, base year 2012) for the metal-mechanic subsector reported as solid gray lines
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workers.16 Considering broad country groupings, Eastern European workers fall 
in the middle of the distribution and do not emerge as particularly high educated. 
They turn out to be, for instance, less educated on average than workers from South 
America (see left panel of Fig.  20). Nonetheless, when considering the six most 
represented nationality groups (right panel), Romanian workers stand out for their 
high qualification levels, which are mainly driven by the high share of workers with 
secondary levels of education, the ones that we deem most relevant for manufactur-
ing blue collar work. In comparison, workers of Moroccan and Chinese origin, dis-
play higher shares of workers with at most primary education. Hence, indeed, while 
we cannot directly include proxies for education in our analysis, the higher level of 
education of these workers may be considered to be a protective factor against the 
risk of injury for these workers. In this respect, the robustness of our results to the 
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Fig. 23  Injury rates by weekly wage decile, Set of foreign workers excludes Romanian workers, All inju-
ries. Injury rates by annual wage decile of male blue collar workers in the metal-mechanic subsector 
over the four sub periods (workers having worked the whole year only). Romanian workers have been 
excluded from the sample. Deciles of the counterfactual distribution obtained by reweighting the distri-
bution of wages prior to calculating the deciles. Injury rates and 95% Poisson confidence intervals com-
puted for each decile and each subsample. Union wage floor ranges relevant for the sub period (constant 
prices, base year 2012) for the metal-mechanic subsector reported as solid gray lines
16 OECD-DIOC data (https ://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm) contain information about immigrants’ 
education by country of origin and of destination, and can give us indications about the levels of educa-
tion of immigrants in Italy in the considered years (the most complete editions are the 2001 and 2010 
ones, and, for Italy, they draw on Census data). We have considered both the 2001 and 2010 releases and 
the results are similar, so we will refer to the 2010 release in what follows.
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exclusion of Romanian workers is particularly important in reassuring that the omis-
sion of unobservable characteristics that are likely to have a a peculiar value in the 
case of Romanian workers does not introduce a systematic distortion in the results. 
Indeed, their relatively skilled profile ensures that Romanian workers are not heavily 
represented among the lowest-wage/highest-risk deciles.
More generally, a declining trend in injury rates over time is observed for natives 
as well, suggesting that the main driver in these dynamics is not a change in the 
composition of immigrants but the change in macroeconomic conditions affecting 
both native and foreign-born groups.
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7-10 years of labour market experience
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(c) (d)
Fig. 24  Injury rates by weekly wage decile, by labour market experience. All injuries. Injury rates by 
annual wage decile of male blue collar workers in the metal-mechanic subsector over the four sub peri-
ods (workers having worked the whole year only). a, c Report the results for workers with labour market 
experience between 2 and 5 years; b, d report the results for workers with labour market experience 
between 7 and 10 years. a, b Refer to all injuries, while c, d to severe injuries only. Deciles of the coun-
terfactual distribution obtained by reweighting the distribution of wages prior to calculating the deciles. 
Injury rates and 95% Poisson confidence intervals computed for each decile and each subsample. The 
minimum and maximum union wage floors over the 1994–2012 period (constant prices, base year 2012) 




The role of the 5‑year requirement for long‑term stay permits
As mentioned in Sect. 3.1, foreign workers who can document an uninterrupted 
regular stay of at least 5 years in Italy can apply for a permanent stay permit 
(previously known as “Carta di Soggiorno Permanente”). Once granted, the per-
manent permit allows legal residence in Italy and the applicant no longer has to 
document the presence of a job for its renewal. In a way, therefore, the 5-year 
requirement for the long-term stay permits can be considered to mark a distinc-
tion between foreign workers who are subject to strong market pressure given that 
their stay is conditional on them having a job, and those for whom this pressure is 
relatively less strong.
In this section, we study how our results change when we compare workers 
with labour market experience that exceeds 5 years with those who do not. A 
number of caveats apply to this analysis, however, in addition to the ones already 
made in Sect. 2. Our measure of labour market experience, while rather precisely 
tracking the first appearance of the person in the formal labour market, can only 
poorly approximate the date in which the foreign workers get their permanent 
residence status. Indeed, the latter depends not only on whether the person spent 
at least 5 years without interruptions in Italy with a valid residence permit. It also 
depends on whether the applicant can document the availability of an accommo-
dation that meets minimum regional housing standards, as well as of a minimum 
Fig. 25  Concentration curves, all injuries. Cumulative share of individuals ranked by annual wage plot-
ted against their cumulative share of exposure-weighted injuries. Larger areas between each curve and 
the diagonal indicate more inequality. Constant prices, base year 2012
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income level that depends on the number of dependent family members. Compli-
ance with the latter conditions is unobserved to us, and their lack may delay the 
procedure. Moreover, since 2009, applicants have to document their mastery of 
the Italian language and, if this is not possible, they have to enroll in an Italian 
language course before the permit can be issued. Furthermore, the administrative 
processing of the application itself can last up to three months since the filing 
date.
For all these reasons, having worked 5 years in Italy does not automatically 
entitle foreign workers to a permanent residence permit. To address this issue 
in our robustness check, we exclude the sixth year from the analysis and decom-
pose the injury rates of workers with a labour market experience between 2 and 
5 years and between 7 and 10 years. We recognize that the profile of a foreign 
worker with less than 5 years of experience may be substantially different from 
that of a native worker with the same experience, so we advise to take our results 
with caution. In particular, we observe that the natives in this subsample are on 
average much younger and more likely to have an apprenticeship contract than 
foreign workers. To increase comparability between groups of workers, we opted 
to exclude younger workers and those with an apprenticeship contract from the 
analysis, but the results are similar if we include them. In an attempt to preserve 
statistical power with the resulting trimmed sample, we pool the four sub-periods 
together, still considering wages at constant prices. The results of this exercise 
are reported below in Fig. 24.
At first sight, Fig. 24a, b reveal no striking differences between the injury rates 
decomposition of workers that have or have not completed 5 years of labour market 
experience. If any, it is the workers with more experience that appear to have slightly 
higher injury rates by the second wage decile, coherently with the results in Sect. 2. 
However, when we look at the severe injuries decomposition in Fig. 24c, d, a differ-
ent picture emerges that suggests an opposite pattern, with less experienced foreign 
workers displaying a higher injury rate by the second wage decile. Taken together, 
these results suggest some underreporting among less-experienced foreign workers 
in the lower-wage deciles. The evidence is however quite weak given the low sta-
tistical power. Nonetheless, a possible interpretation is that labour market pressure 
linked to the prospective award of a permanent residence permit increases the incen-
tives to underreport. Differently from the effects of a downturn, this kind of pressure 
would not directly increase the probability that the worker is laid off, but rather his 
own tolerance to injury risk. While this seems a plausible interpretation, the above 
caveats urge us not to take these results too far but rather to encourage further and 
more targeted research on the issue.
Concentration curves
The pattern identified in Sect. 4.3 is similar to the one that we would observe if 
we plotted a slope index of inequality. In the latter case, we would have ranked 
individuals by their wages and would have constructed bins that correspond to 
their relative shares of the population, and we would then compute the slope of 
1 3
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17 In order to compare wages across time, all wages are reported at constant 2012 prices.
the line linking the midpoints of these bins (Wagstaff et  al. 1991). Instead of 
using cumulative shares of the population, as we use deciles, i.e. equally sized 
bins, we deemed it more illustrative to link each decile to their respective wage 
levels. The advantage of this approach is to provide insights on the within-group 
distribution of injuries while also showing the relative position of the three sub-
groups in terms of wage.
Another way to look at the inequality of the distribution of injury rates by wage 
is to construct a concentration curve (Wagstaff et  al. 1991; Kakwani et  al. 1997), 
which ranks individuals by wages and associates the cumulative share of injuries 
to the cumulative share of the individuals ranked by their wage.17 Concentration 
curves are in essence a two-variable modification of the Lorenz curve which allow 
comparing the distribution of the cumulative shares of “ill health” (e.g., injuries) 
with the corresponding quantiles of population ranked by wage. As with the Lorenz 
curve, the further away the concentration curve is from the 45-degree line, the more 
concentrated is the distribution. A concentration curve that lies above the diagonal 
indicates concentration of ill-health among the lower wages, while a concentration 
curve lying below the diagonal indicates concentration among the high wages. The 
corresponding concentration index can be computed as twice the area between the 
concentration curve and the diagonal. The counterfactual concentration curve was 
obtained by reweighting the observations by the DFL weight. Figure  25 refers to 
all injuries and reports the concentration curves of the injury rates for the subsam-
ples of natives, foreigners, and for the counterfactual over the four time periods that 
we consider: 1994–1998, 1999–2002, 2003–2006, and 2007–2012. As expected, the 
curves are located at or above the 45 ◦ line, which implies that injuries are more con-
centrated among the lower salaries. The concentration curve of natives dominates 
the one of foreigners, indicating greater inequality in the distribution of injuries by 
wages in the native population: if natives had the same distribution of characteris-
tics as the foreigners, they would show greater concentration—i.e. the concentration 
curve for the counterfactual also dominates the one of foreigners.
The dominance of the natives’ curve with respect to the foreigners’ decreases 
over time , with the concentration curve of foreigners getting closer and closer to 
the diagonal. In part, this is due to the characteristics of foreigners: the counterfac-
tual curve is below the natives’ in all cases, implying that sectoral and demographic 
characteristics in part contribute to a more rigid relationship between salaries and 
injury rates, as could be expected. Comparing the counterfactual with the observed 
curve, however, it is apparent that the mechanism hindering the trade off between 
salaries and wages trade-off remains to a large extent due to the specificity of being 
a foreign worker, as the counterfactual curve is in turn neatly dominating the for-
eigners’ in all cases.
A final insight offered by the concentration curves refers to the latter time slot: 
the increasing dominance of the natives’ concentration curve with respect to that 
of foreigners is less and less due to differences in the observable characteristics of 
the foreign workers: indeed, the counterfactual concentration of injuries by salaries 
is quite similar, especially in the lower quantiles of the wage distributions, to the 
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observed curve of natives. In other words, if in recent years natives had the same 
characteristics as foreigners they would have a very similar concentration curve as 
the one we actually observe: this is likely because natives in the lower quantiles of 
wage have moved to the same sectors and work contracts which were previously 
reserved to immigrants. Hence, the difference in characteristics explains a negligible 
portion of the difference in the two concentration curves and the residual difference 
increases.
Overall, the concentration curves show that inequalities in the injury distribution 
by wage have been noticeably decreasing over the 18 years of our sample.
A shortcoming of the concentration curves as an analytical tool lies in that each 
curve refers to within-group inequality and per se does not provide information 
about where the lower and upper tail of foreigners’ salaries is located with respect 
to the natives’ wage distributions. Indeed, because the range of salaries is substan-
tially different between the natives and the foreigners’ population, it would be mis-
leading to draw conclusions solely on the basis of concentration curves; and the 
concentration index is insensitive to the mean level of salaries and injuries in each 
subpopulation.
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